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INTRODUCTION
Two words best describe the current litigation over San Fran-
cisco's 1983 desegregation consent decree: ironic and inevitable.
Ironic, because Ho v. San Francisco Unified School District' casts Chinese
American school children on one side and the NAACP on the other
side of a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection challenge to the
terms of a desegregation plan developed to eliminate racial discrimi-
nation and guarantee equal opportunity to all of San Francisco's mi-
nority school children. Inevitable, because every desegregation plan
must, by definition, begin by classifying individuals on the basis of
race, and at a very basic level, the goal of ensuring racial diversity
stands in opposition to the right to equal opportunity.
At the center of the controversy are a 1983 Consent Decree and
San Francisco's Lowell High School, "the oldest and one of the most
prestigious public high schools west of the Mississippi."2 Lowell is not
a typical public high school. Among the 139 year old school's3 distin-
guished graduates are a governor,4 two Nobel laureates,5 and a
Supreme Court Justice,6 and several other famous figures.7 Indeed,
there appears to be little dispute that Lowell is a "magnet for [the]
city's smartest public school students."8 One source reported that
"[f] orty-five percent of Lowell students qualify as 'gifted and talented'
1 No. 94-2418 (N.D. Cal. filedJuly 11, 1994).
2 Elaine Woo, Caught on the Wrong Side of the Line? Chinese Americans Must Outscore All
Other Groups to EnterElite Lowell High in San Francisco, Sparking an Ugly Battle overDiversity and
the Image of a "Model Minority, "LA TIMEs, July 13, 1995, at Al; see Venise Wagner, Elite S.
School Faces New Policy: Lowell Admissions Plan Goes to Board in Wake of Lawsuit, S.F. EXAMINER,
Dec. 21, 1995, at Al.
3 See Woo, supra note 2, at Al.
4 See id. at A6 (Governor Edmund G. Brown, Sr.).
5 See id. (physicist Albert Michelson and physiologist Joseph Erlanger).
6 See id. (Stephen G. Breyer).
7 See id. (Naturalist Dian Fossey and sculptor Alexander Calder also graduated from
Lowell.).
8 Id. at Al. See also Marsha Ginsburg, Can S.F. Create another Lowell High?, S.F. EXAM-
INER, Mar. 6, 1994, at B1 ("Lowell is the Harvard of the public school system, offering a 99-
year-old debate program, one of the top 10 high school newspapers in the country and
more advanced placement courses than any other public high school in San Francisco
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compared to 14.6% citywide." 9 Another referred to Lowell as "a desir-
able intellectual oasis in a state whose academic performance rou-
tinely ranks among the worst in the nation."10
The admission procedure at Lowell, "an academic alternative
high school,"" is unique among the schools comprising the San Fran-
cisco Unified School District (SFUSD).12 Lowell admits the majority
of its students according to a sixty-nine point numerical index based
on grades and test scores.' 3 Despite its competitive admissions policy,
however, enrollment at Lowell must comply with the 1983 Consent
Decree's terms for alternative schools: the school must enroll stu-
dents from at least four ethnic/racial groups, and enrollment by any
single group must not exceed forty-five percent of the total student
body.14 As a result, the standard for admission to Lowell varies ac-
cording to race. As of March 1994, minimum scores for admission to
Lowell were sixty-two for Chinese Americans, fifty-eight for Whites and
other Asian Americans, and fifty-three for Black and Latino
Americans.' 5
As these figures demonstrate, the Consent Decree's diversity re-
quirement and racial caps impact San Francisco's various ethnic/ra-
cial constituents in very different ways. In particular, they enhance
the opportunities of African American and Latino students to attend
Lowell.' 6 Similarly, though to a lesser degree, the caps benefit Whites
and non-Chinese Asians by insulating them from competition with
Chinese American students with higher scores. For Chinese American
students, however, the provisions of the Decree operate as a rigid
9 Nanette Asimov, Distria's Long Struggle with Desegregation, S.F. CHRON., June 19,
1995, at A9.
10 Nanette Asimov, A Hard Lesson in Diversity: Chinese Americans Fight Lowell's Admissions
Policy, S.F. CHRON., June 19, 1995, at Al.
11 Ho v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., No. 94-2418 (motion to dismiss denied,
Sept. 28, 1995), 2 n.2.
12 Lowell is the only school in the SFUSD that admits students based on a numerical
measure of their academic performance. See id.
13 SeeVenise Wagner, Admission Quotas Hinder Education, S.F. Suit Says Chinese American
Parents Target Higher Standards Put in Their Children's Way, S.F. EXAMNER, July 12, 1994, at
A2. In addition, to maintain the required level of diversity, Lowell's. policy includes "a
specific affirmative track, in which blacks and Hispanics with even lower scores are admit-
ted and given special tutoring...." Michael Dorgan, Desegregation or Resegregation? Draw
Fire SACRAMENTO BEE, July 2, 1995, at FOL.
14 San Francisco NAACP v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist, 576 F. Supp. 34,53 (N.D.
Cal. 1983).
15 See Wagner, supra note 13, at A2; Lawrence Siskind, Racial Quotas Didn't Work in S.F.
Schools, S.F. ExAMINER, July 6, 1994, at A13 (Minimum scores for admission to Lowell in
1993 were 66 for Chinese Americans, 59 for Whites and otherAsians, and 56 for Blacks and
Latinos.).
16 Despite the lower admissions cut off, Black and Latino students represented only




"glass ceiling," significantly suppressing their opportunities to partici-
pate in Lowell's enriched academic program, despite academic quali-
fications superior to those of all other groups, including Whites. 1
7
"Without the caps, Lowell could be almost all Chinese American."'
8
At the time of its establishment in 1983, San Francisco's Consent
Decree stood as a shining example of cooperation, dedication, and
sensitivity to the needs and interests of the district's unusually diverse
school-aged population.19 Indeed, the Decree has been hailed as
"one of the nation's most far-reaching school desegregation plans"20
and "has been held up as a national model for achieving integration
in an era when racial issues are no longer black and white but involve
the entire palette of humanity."'2 ' The facts underlying the Ho litiga-
tion demonstrate, however, that conditions within the district have
shifted in the years since 1983 to a point at which the interests of
differing racial/ethnic constituents now palpably clash. At its most
basic level, Ho reveals the ironic fact that the desegregation plan, for-
mulated to eliminate discrimination against all minority groups, cur-
rently operates as an affirmative action program for Whites and non-
Chinese minority groups, while sharply restricting opportunities for
equally and higher scoring Chinese Americans.
The Lowell controversy reveals the problems of interminority and
majority-minority group conflict that have arisen from race-conscious
measures implemented to remedy segregation. It also provides a
good starting point for a discussion of the continuing problems of
racial discrimination in post-Brown America. Ho makes clear that
school districts like the SFUSD cannot hope to proceed into the
twenty-first century without confronting and resolving issues regard-
ing the desirable and appropriate balance of individual rights, diver-
sity, color-blindness, and race-conscious remedial programs in an
increasingly multicultural society. In addition, although the dilemma
17 Chinese American students represented 43% of Lowell's student population in
1995. The 40% racial cap imposed in the fall of 1995 resulted in the exclusion of 94
Chinese American applicants with scores equal to or surpassing the 58 point cut off for
Whites and other Asians. See id.
18 Venise Wagner & Susan Ferriss, Day of Decision for Lowell High:Judge to Rule this Week
on Suit over Race-based Policy on Admissions: Soul-Searching over Fairness, S.F. EXAMINER, May 8,
1995, at Al.
19 Judge William Orrick, the judge presiding over the Decree, noted "the enormous
effort exerted not only by the parties themselves ... but also by the best experts on deseg-
regation in the country, and by one of the top law firms in the country, Wilmer, Cutler &
Pickering of Washington, D.C." San Francisco NAACP v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist.,
576 F. Supp. 34, 36-37 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
20 Nanette Asimov, District's Long Struggle with Desegregation, S.F. CHRON., June 19,
1995, at A9.
21 Dorgan, supra note 13, at FOL.
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facing San Francisco may be unique at this time,22 it is one that inevi-
tably will arise with increasing frequency in communities across the
nation as the American population grows more and more diverse.23
An equitable and thoughtful response by the California district court
and by the parties involved in the Ho litigation could serve as a bench-
mark and guide for otherjurisdictions as they confront similar contro-
versies in the future. This Note seeks to encourage further
consideration and rigorous thought regarding these vital questions.
Part I sets forth the background from which the current litigation
arises. Parts II and III examine and evaluate the legal issues raised in
Ho, based on the Supreme Court's desegregation and affirmative ac-
tion cases. Part IV discusses the tensions inherent in attempting to
accommodate the dual goals of maintaining an integrated and ethni-
cally diverse school system while simultaneously protecting individual
students' constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. As the
facts of the Ho case poignantly illustrate, there is no simple way to
protect the interests of one group without sacrificing, to some degree,
the interests of another. Part IV also addresses the broader implica-
tions of the issues of interminority group conflict and majority-minor-
ity group conflict raised by Ho, and examines several alternatives for
dealing with the problems presented, including maintenance of the
current system, complete dissolution of the Consent Decree, and vari-
ous compromise solutions.
This Note concludes by positing that the best solution to the Low-
ell controversy is the adoption of an admissions policy that establishes
a color-blind, neo-majority applicant pool, but preserves a meaningful
affirmative action policy to ensure continuing access to opportunities
for members of disadvantaged minority groups. This solution would
enable the SFUSD to continue redressing the wrongs caused by past
discrimination, while simultaneously allowing the district to work to-
ward the ultimate aspiration of a color-blind society in which individu-
als are able to compete on equal footing without regard to race.
22 See Gale Holland & Maria Goodavage, California's Asian Students Face Quandary,
U.S.A. TODAY, Aug. 23, 1995, at 1A: "Although racial competition is on the rise in the USA,
the collision of Asian-American achievement with affirmative action is uniquely Califor-
nian. No other state has so many different ethnic groups competing for dwindling re-
sources. And few other states have such a prestigious, and still-affordable, university
system."
23 See Alexandra Natapoff, Note, Trouble in Paradise: Equal Protection and the Dilemma of
Interminority Group Conflict 47 STAN. L. REv. 1059, 1060 (1995) ("By the year 2050, people
of color will make up approximately one-half of the United States' population .... " (citing
William P. O'Hare, America's Minorities-The Demographics of Diversity, POPULATION BuLL.,





In May of 1983, the San Francisco Unified School District
(SFUSD) and the San Francisco NAACP entered into a Consent De-
cree by order of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California 24 to desegregate San Francisco's one-hundred
and seven 25 public elementary and high schools. Like all desegrega-
tion plans established pursuant to the Supreme Court's mandate in
Brown v. Board of Education (Brown JJ),26 SFUSD's plan aimed to elimi-
nate race-based discrimination in the district's public schools.
From the outset, the parties faced a formidable task due to the
unusually broad ethnic and racial diversity of the district's school-aged
population.27 At the time of the establishment of the Consent Decree,
African Americans comprised 23.1% of the total school-aged popula-
tion and represented the district's largest racial minority.28 Chinese,
Latino, and White Americans were the next largest groups, compris-
ing 19.5, 17.2, and 16.9% respectively.29 The final Decree recognized
nine separate racial/ethnic groups: Spanish-surnamed, other White,
Black, Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Filipino, American Indian, and
other non-White. 0
The SFUSD's ambitious plan aimed not only to eliminate segrega-
tion, but also "to achieve throughout the system, the broadest practi-
cable distribution of students from all the racial/ethnic groups
comprising the general student population."8 ' In order to accomplish
these goals, the terms of the Decree required representation by at
least four racial/ethnic groups in each student body8 2 and imposed
the condition that no single group could represent "more than 45%
24 San Francisco NAACP v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 576 F. Supp. 34, 51-60
(N.D. Cal. 1983). The NAACP filed the original desegregation action against the SFUSD
in 1978 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. San
Francisco NAACP v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., No. C-78-1445 WHO, 1993 WL
299365, 1 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
25 See Venise Wagner, Rojas' Rules: Controversial S.F. School Superintendent Bill Rojas has
Demonstrated the Courage to Shake up the System. The Question Remains: Will Our Schools Get
Better?, S.F. ExAmINER, July 30, 1995, at Mll.
26 349 U.S. 294 (1955). Brown II charged local school authorities, under supervision
by federal district courts, "to effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school
system." Id. at 301.
27 See San Francisco NAACP, 576 F. Supp. at 40.
28 See id. at 37.
29 See id. The remaining five groups were: Filipino (8.7%),Japanese (1.1%), Korean
(1.0%), American Indian (0.6%), and other non-white (11.9%). Id.
80 See id. at 40.
31 Id.
32 See id. at 53.
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of the student enrollment at any regular school, nor more than 40%
at [designated] alternative schools."
8 3
Nearly ten years later, in July 1992, the court appointed a "Com-
mittee of Experts" to review the SFUSD's progress in fulfilling the pro-
visions of the Consent Decree and to recommend adjustments in the
implementation of the Decree.3 4 Among its findings,3 5 the Commit-
tee noted that the district's demographic composition had shifted.
Chinese American students now constituted 24%, Latino students
19%, and Black students 18.8% of the total student population.36
Despite these demographic changes, the district court, after con-
vening a fairness hearing on April 8, 199337 at which it entertained
two motions to intervene in the "new phase" of the proceedings, 38
"decline[d] to grant permissive intervention to any party."3 9 Multicul-
tural Education, Training and Advocacy, Inc. ("META") filed one of
the motions, seeking to intervene on behalf of organizations includ-
ing parents of Latino students, individually named Latino students
and parents, Chinese for Affirmative Action ("CAA"), and individually
named Chinese American students and parents.40 META argued that
unless they were allowed to intervene, "the interests of Latino and
Chinese American students [would] be impaired . . . because their
unique cultural needs [would] not be taken into account. '41 In sup-
port of its argument, META cited "the refusal of the NAACP counsel
to incorporate META's suggestions about the Consent Decree amend-
ments into the NAACP's statements to the Court."42
33 Id.
34 San Francisco NAACP v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., No. C-78-1445 WHO,
1993 WL 299365 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
35 The Committee found, inter alia, that "considerable progress had been made both
in terms of complying with the desegregation standards... and in implementing educa-
tional reform in some of the schools." Id. at *1. However, its Report also called for the
expansion of reforms in "schools where there had been few gains for minority students."
Id. See Siskind, supra note 15, at A13 (criticizing the consent decree's "quota system").
36 See San Francisco NAACP v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 1993 WL 299365 at *1
(N.D. Cal. 1993); Siskind, supra note 15, at A13 (noting that because of low dropout rates
among Chinese American students, more than a third of the SFUSD's seniors are of Chi-
nese descent, and, consequently, almost half of the regular and magnet high schools in the
district are "capped out" for Chinese American children).
37 San Francisco NAACP v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 1993 WL 299365, at *2
(N.D. Cal. 1993).
38 See id. at "8.
39 Id. at *8.
40 The California Teachers Association filed the other motion, seeking to intervene
on behalf of the United Educators of San Francisco ("UESF"), the union representing the
SFUSD's certified teachers and paraprofessionals. See id.
41 Id. at *6.
42 Id.
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The NAACP and the state jointly opposed the motions to inter-
vene,43 arguing that "the prospective intervenors [did] not seriously
attempt to criticize their past representation" 44 and that the NAACP
was willing to continue to represent their interests.45 The court, ap-
plying the Ninth Circuit's four-part test46 governing motions for per-
missive intervention in class actions,47 denied META's motion on the
grounds that "[t]he NAACP is certainly capable of representing the
interests of non-African American school children"48 because "the de-
segregation of the schools with respect to all races[ ] is an interest the
NAACP shares with the proposed student and parent intervenors."
49
Significantly, although the court denied META's motion to inter-
vene, it specifically acknowledged the desirability of "expert under-
standing of the special situation of Latino and Asian students."50 The
court thus granted these groups amicus curiae status in the proceed-
ings5l and allowed each group to "request the Court to appoint a rep-
resentative to the Advisory Committee."5 2 In addition, the court
denied META's motion without prejudice,53 "recogniz[ing) that at a
future time, the present parties may be incapable of representing the
interests represented by the amici curiae groups, and those interests
would be seriously impaired if the amici curiae were not allowed to
intervene."
54
43 See id. at *2. The SFUSD initially filed a brief in opposition to both motions to
intervene. However, after hearing oral argument, the SFUSD "changed its position and
filed a notice of nonopposition to the motion to intervene filed by META." Id.
44 Id. at *7.
45 See id.
46 The Ninth Circuit test sets forth the following requirements:
First, the applicant's motion must be timely; second the applicant must as-
sert an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject
of the action; third, the applicant must be so situated that without interven-
tion the disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or im-
pede its ability to protect that interest; and fourth, the applicant's interest
must be inadequately represented by the parties to the action.
Id. at *3 (quoting Scotts Valley Band of Pomo Indians v. United States, 921 F.2d 924, 926
(9th Cir. 1990)).
47 Permissive intervention in a class action "is committed to the discretion of the trial
court as long as there is a common question of fact or law between the interests of the
proposed intervenors and the subject matter of the litigation." Id. at *8 (citing Fed. R. Civ.
P. 24(b) (2)).
48 Id. at *7.
49 Id.
50 Id. at *8.
51 See id.
52 Id. at *9. Originally called the Monitoring Committee, the court created the Advi-
sory Committee in early 1993. The purpose of the Committee is to "provid[e] a neutral
forum for discussion of suggestions of the State's monitor, and [to] advis[e] the Court
from an educational policy perspective on the progress toward achieving the Consent De-
cree goals." Id. at *2.
53 See id. at *9.
54 Id.
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The specter of interminority group conflict foreseen by the court
in San Francisco NAACI5 5 took concrete form on July 11, 1994, when
the parents of three Chinese American students56 filed a class action
suit against the SFUSD on behalf of the class of school-aged children
of Chinese descent eligible to attend school in the district.57 On Janu-
ary 19, 1995, the SFNAACP was joined as a defendant in the action
pursuant to a court order.58 The plaintiffs in Ho v. San Francisco Uni-
fied School District59 seek to dissolve the Consent Decree on the
grounds that the SFUSD is no longer segregated and that the Consent
Decree violates their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protec-
tion by "invalidly classif[ying] and bas[ing] student school assign-
ments on race."60
II
THE TREND IN THE AREA OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION:
LEGAL ISSUES AND SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
In seeking dissolution of the 1983 desegregation decree entered
into by the San Francisco NAACP and the SFUSD, the plaintiffs in Ho
v. San Francisco Unified School District61 offer two main arguments.
First, they argue that the "SFUSD has not operated segregated schools
in the past ten years." 62 Second, they contend that "the Consent De-
cree imposes an unconstitutional system to remedy desegregation
[sic]."65 Two lines of the Supreme Court's Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection cases thus bear heavily on the legal issues raised by
the Ho litigation. The school desegregation cases, beginning with
Brown v. Board of Education, help place the Ho case in its proper histori-
cal context and shed light on the Court's current position with regard
to dissolution of desegregation decrees. The affirmative action cases,
particularly Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,64 illuminate
the Supreme Court's current position regarding the nature of the
Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection in general, and
more specifically, clarify the Court's stance regarding the use of racial
55 1993 WL 299365 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
56 The named plaintiffs are Carl Ho, Charlene Wong, and Jane Chen. See Venise
Wagner, S.F. Sued Over School Admission Quotas: Desegregation Effort "Failed Miserably," Chinese
American Group Maintains in Bid for More Access, S.F. EXAMiNER, July 11, 1994, at Al.
57 Ho v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., No. G-94-2418 (N.D. Cal. motion to dismiss
denied, September 28, 1995).
58 See id.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 2. The Ho case is discussed more thoroughly infra Parts II-III.
61 No. G-94-2418 (N.D. Cal. motion to dismiss denied, September 28, 1995).
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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classifications and quotas as a means of ensuring diversity in school
populations.
This Part focuses on the Supreme Court's seminal school deseg-
regation cases and discusses the Court's current focus on limiting and
withdrawing federal court supervision in the school desegregation
area. It then discusses recent cases in which the Supreme Court has
addressed the specific issue of the dissolution of public school deseg-
regation decrees and attempts to elucidate the Court's current stan-
dards for dissolution. Finally, it addresses the likely impact that those
principles will have on the Ho litigation and concludes that Supreme
Court precedent tends to support the plaintiffs' prayer for full or par-
tial dissolution of San Francisco's desegregation decree.
A. The School Desegregation Cases: A Brief History
In its 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education,65 the United
States Supreme Court abandoned fifty-eight years of contrary prece-
dent66 and struck down laws in four states67 enforcing racial segrega-
tion in public schools as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection Clause.68 Despite equalization of "physical facilities
and other 'tangible' factors,"69 the Court asserted that racial segrega-
tion "generates a feeling of inferiority as to [Black children's] status in
the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way un-
likely ever to be undone." 70 "Separate educational facilities," wrote
Chief Justice Warren, "are inherently unequal."71
The following year, in Brown If,7 2 the Court mandated the elimi-
nation of racial discrimination in the public schools7 3 and assigned
roles to local school authorities and federal district courts in imple-
menting the transition to unitary school systems.74 "School authori-
ties ha[d] primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and
solving" problems related to desegregation.7 5 District courts,
65 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
66 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548 (1896) (upholding the constitutionality of
a Louisiana statute enforcing racial segregation in railway accommodations). Until the
Court expressly rejected Pessy in Brown, the prevailing doctrine was that for Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause purposes, "equality of treatment [was] accorded
when the races [were] provided substantially equal facilities, even though these facilities be
separate." Brown, 347 U.S. at 488. For a discussion of the evolution in the Court's under-
standing of the significance of race, see infra Part IV.Al.
67 Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware. See id. at 486.
68 See id. at 495.
69 Id. at 492-93.
70 Id. at 494.
71 Id. at 495.
72 Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
73 See id. at 301.
74 See id. at 300. See also supra note 26 and accompanying text.
75 Brown , 349 U.S. at 299.
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"[b]ecause of their proximity to local conditions,"76 had the job of
appraising the school authorities' efforts7 7 and ensuring that they
made a "prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance."
78
Initially, the Court approached the task of desegregation aggres-
sively, directing the district courts to draw upon their equitable pow-
ers and to show "a practical flexibility in shaping [their] remedies and
.. a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs."7 9
Green v. County School Board80 exemplifies this proactive attitude. In
Green, the Court rejected a "freedom-of-choice" desegregation plan as
an insufficient means of effectuating desegregation.8 ' Evincing a tone
of urgency, the Green Court declared that with regard to the disman-
tling of segregated schools, "delays [were] no longer tolerable,"8 2 and
ordered the school board to "come forward with a plan that promises
realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now."8 3
Three years later in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educa-
tion,8 4 the Court's attitude towards desegregation began to take on a
new tone of restraint. The Swann Court's stated goal was to "amplify
guidelines" to assist school authorities and courts in their integration
efforts.8 5 In particular, the Court undertook to clarify the nature and
scope of the district courts' equitable powers.8 6 Although continuing
to describe the scope as "broad,"8 7 the Court cautioned the district
courts against overstepping the bounds of their equitable authority88
and reminded them that 'Judicial powers may be exercised only on
the basis of a constitutional violation."8 9 The Court stressed that the
"target" of Brown was the elimination of state-enforced dual school sys-
tems,90 and that this objective "[did] not and [could] not embrace all
the problems of racial prejudice."91
76 Id.
77 See id.
78 Id. at 300.
79 Id.
80 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
81 Id. at 441.
82 Id. at 438.
83 Id. at 439. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 9-13 (1958) (denying a school board's
request to stay implementation of its desegregation plan despite "extreme public
hostility").
84 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
85 Id. at 14.
86 See id. at 15.
87 Id.
88 See id. at 16 (stating that "U]udicial authority enters only when local authority
defaults").
89 Id.
90 Id. at 22.
91 Id. at 23.
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B. The New Phase in Desegregation Litigation: Restraint and
Withdrawal of Supervision
Although the Swann Court upheld remedial measures including
"very limited use" of race-balancing quotas,92 race-conscious alteration
of attendance zones, 93 and involuntary busing,94 its emphasis on the
limits of the district courts' remedial powers signaled the onset of a
new phase in the Court's approach to desegregation. 95 The Court
gave concrete form to Swann's reference to limits in Pasadena City
Board of Education v. Spangler.96 The "Pasadena Plan," established in
1970, imposed a "no majority of any minority" rule to remedy segrega-
tion in the Pasadena Unified School District (PUSD). 97 The Supreme
Court held that the supervising district court had exceeded its reme-
dial authority by ordering school authorities to make yearly adjust-
ments in attendance zones to maintain integration in the schools.98
According to the Court, "having once implemented a racially neutral
attendance pattern,"99 the district court had fulfilled its proper func-
tion and "was not entitled to require the PUSD to rearrange its attend-
ance zones each year so as to ensure that the racial mix desired by the
court was maintained in perpetuity.' u00
The trend away from proactive efforts to desegregate has contin-
ued. The Supreme Court's most recent decisions in the desegrega-
tion area have focused heavily on the withdrawal of federal oversight
and the return of control to local school authorities. 10 1 In Board of
Education v. Dowell 02 the Supreme Court held that "injunctions en-
tered in school desegregation cases... [were] not intended to oper-
ate in perpetuity."' 03 In so ruling, the Court rejected the Tenth
Circuit's holding that "a desegregation decree could not be lifted or
92 Id. at 25.
93 See id. at 27.
94 See id. at 29-30.
95 SeeJohn D. Casais, Ignoring the Harm: The Supreme Court, Stigmatic Injury, and the End
of SchoolDesegregation, 14 B.C. THIRD WORLD LJ. 259, 271-73 (1994);John Dayton, Desegrega-
tion: Is the Court Preparing to Say it is Finished?, 84 Evuc. LAw REP. 897 (1993). See also
William M. Gordon & David E. Bartz, Achieving Unitay Status Under the Combined Standards of
Dowell and Pitts, 82 EDuc. LAw REP. 283 (1993) ("Elimination of segregation 'root and
branch' ... has for all practical purposes given way to a lesser standard, allowing the courts
to overlook or let school systems excuse segregative situations that in the past would not
have been acceptable.").
96 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
97 Id. at 434-35.
98 See id. at 435.
99 Id. at 436-37.
100 Id. at 436.
101 See Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467
(1992); Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
102 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
103 Id. at 248.
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modified absent a showing of 'grievous wrong evoked by new and un-
foreseen conditions."' 104 The Court espoused the view that federal
supervision of local school systems "[f]rom the very first ... was in-
tended as a temporary measure to remedy past discrimination."10 5
Dissolution was thus appropriate when school authorities had com-
plied with the decree for a "reasonable period of time."'
10 6
The Court also reiterated the "inherent limitation" of federal ju-
dicial authority07 and emphasized that "federal court decrees must
directly address and relate to the constitutional violation itself." 10
Moreover, the Court cautioned that judicial regulation of school de-
segregation should "not extend beyond the time required to remedy
the effects of past intentional discrimination"10 9 and asserted that dis-
solution "properly recognize [d]" the "important values of local con-
trol of public school systems.""10
The Dowell opinion made clear that the standard for dissolution
was no longer the "root and branch" elimination of racial discrimina-
tion required by Green,"' but a more relaxed standard of "whether the
vestiges of past discrimination had been eliminated to the extent prac-
ticable." 112 At the same time, the Dowell Court retained Green's re-
quirement that district courts look to "every facet of school
operations" in making the determination to withdraw supervision. 113
The following year, however, the Court dispensed with this require-
ment in Freeman v. Pitts.114 In Pitts, the Court held that a district court
could, in its discretion, "relinquish supervision and control of school
districts in incremental stages, before full compliance ha[d] been
achieved in every area of school operations." 1 5 In addition, the Pitts
Court emphasized that the "ultimate objective" was withdrawal of fed-
eral court supervision and return of "schools to the control of local
authorities at the earliest practicable date."116
104 Id. at 246 (quoting United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932)).
105 Id. at 247.
106 Id. at 248.
107 Id. at 247 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 282 (1977)). See supra notes
86-91 and accompanying text.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 248.
110 Id.
111 Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968).
112 Dowel4 498 U.S. at 250. To determine whether this goal had been achieved, the
Court directed the district court to consider the six facets of school operations set forth in
Green: student assignments, faculty, staff, transportation, extra-curricular activities and fa-
cilities. Id. (citing Green, 391 U.S. at 435). See Gordon & Bartz, supra note 95, at 283.
113 Dowell 498 U.S. at 250 (quoting Green, 391 U.S. at 435).
114 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
115 Id. at 490.
116 Id. at 490.
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1. Racial Imbalance in School Populations
The Pitts opinion, in addition to endorsing incremental with-
drawal of court supervision of school desegregation efforts, squarely
addressed the issue of current racial imbalances in the student bodies
of individual schools. The racial composition of DeKalb County,
Georgia, the area encompassing the school district at issue in Pitts,
had changed drastically since 1969, when the district court first or-
dered the school system to desegregate. 117 Between 1969 and 1986,
the proportion of Black students in the district had grown from 5.6%
to forty-seven percent of the student population,"18 and by 1986, a
significant number of the system's school populations were comprised
predominantly of either Black or white students. 119 Nevertheless, the
district court held that it would withdraw from further supervision in
the area of student placements120 upon finding that the racial imbal-
ance "was not a vestige of the prior de jure system,' 21 but rather a
result of demographic change.
The Supreme Court, in considering the district court's determi-
nation, noted that "[o]nce the racial imbalance due to the dejurevio-
lation has been remedied, the school district is under no duty to
remedy imbalance that is caused by demographic factors."' 22 Signifi-
cantly, the Court also asserted that "[r]acial balance is not to be
achieved for its own sake," but only as a response to a constitutional
violation. 123 It then proceeded to discuss in strong terms the limits of
legal responsibility for continuing discrimination:
In one sense of the term, vestiges of past segregation by state decree
do remain in our society and in our schools. Past wrongs to the
black race, wrongs committed by the State and in its name, are a
stubborn fact of history. And stubborn facts of history linger and
persist. But though we cannot escape our history, neither must we
117 See id. at 493.
118 See id. at 475.
119 In the 1986-1987 school year,
(1) 47% of the students attending DCSS were black; (2) 50% of the black
students attended schools that were over 90% black; (3) 62% of all black
students attended schools that had more than 20% more blacks than the
system-wide average; (4) 27% of white students attended schools that were
more than 90% white; (5) 59% of the white students attended schools that
had more than 20% more whites than the system-wide average; (6) of the
22 DCSS high schools, five had student populations that were more than
90% black, while five other schools had student populations that were more
than 80% white; and (7) of the 74 elementary schools in DCSS, 18 are over
90% black, while 10 are over 90% white.
Id. at 476-77.
120 See id at 484. The process of placing students in particular schools is referred to as
student assignments.
121 Id. at 478.




overstate its consequences in fixing legal responsibilities.... It is
simply not always the case that demographic forces causing popula-
tion change bear any real and substantial relation to a de jure viola-
tion. And the law need not proceed on that premise.' 24
Having thus established the severely restricted responsibility of the
courts in remedying continuing discrimination, the Supreme Court
upheld the district court's withdrawal of supervision over student
assignments.
125
C. The Principles Applied
As Spangler, Dowell, and Pitts demonstrate, the Supreme Court's
focus with regard to desegregation decrees has changed significantly
since the time of Green. In 1968, a school desegregation plan was
judged by its effectiveness in bringing about an immediate end to ra-
cial segregation. 26 Today, a district court must instead consider
whether it has exceeded its remedial authority, 27 and will have the
option to withdraw incrementally its supervision over any area in
which the school district has shown compliance for a "reasonable pe-
riod of time." At the same time, the court must keep in mind its duty
to relinquish control at the "earliest practicable date." 28
These principles will undoubtedly bear upon the district court's
approach to the plaintiffs' prayer for dissolution in Ho v. San Francisco
Unified School District. Indeed, the court's 1993 opinion regarding the
"next phase" of the ongoing desegregation litigation, demonstrated
the court's awareness of the fast approaching limits of its supervisory
authority. The court found that "considerable progress had been
made ... in terms of complying with the desegregation standards,"' 29
and noted that "the litigation [was] shifting to questions of educa-
tional policy, which [would] be investigated by a committee of
nonlawyers."' 0 In addition, the court discussed "[t]he limited useful-
ness of the legal system at this stage," and concluded that "[t] he most
124 Id. at 495-96.
125 Id. at 491 ("[T]he district court may determine that it will not order further reme-
dies in the area of student assignments where racial imbalance is not traceable, in a proxi-
mate way, to constitutional violations."). The principles set forth in DoweU and Freeman
were further reinforced in Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
126 See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968).
127 See, e.g., Missouri v.Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2054 (1995) (reaffirming the "bedrock
principle that 'federal-court decrees exceed appropriate limits if they are aimed at elimi-
nating a condition that does not violate the Constitution or does not flow from such a
violation'") (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 282 (1977)).
128 Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490 (1992). For discussion of the Court's current
attitude towards federal supervision of local school boards, see supra Part II.B.
129 San Francisco NAACP v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., No. C-78-1445 WHO,
1993 W.L. 299365, at *1 (N.D. Cal. filedJuly 22, 1993).
130 Id. at *8.
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important work of the coming years [would] be carried out by the
SFUSD and monitored by the State."
13 1
The Report of the court-appointed Committee apparently gives
no indication that the SFUSD has continued to operate a dual school
system in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Clause, or that the continuing problems were related to de jure dis-
crimination on the part of the SFUSD.13 2 Absent such findings, the
district court would have no authority under Spangler and Pitts to or-
der continuing remedial action in these areas.' 33
Furthermore, in light of the Spangler decision, the district court
may already be exceeding its remedial authority by continuing to or-
der the SFUSD to comply with the Consent Decree's racial mixing and
racial cap requirements.'3 In order to comply with these provisions,
San Francisco school authorities must recalculate Lowell's admissions
standards on an annual basis'3 5 to ensure that Chinese American stu-
dents will not puncture the ceiling of their forty percent quota. This
requirement appears to run afoul of the line the Supreme Court drew
in Spangler to mark the limits of a supervising court's authority. 36 It
also violates the Court's traditional prohibition of requirements un-
dertaken to ensure a specific and perpetual "racial mix."13 7
131 Id. Indeed, it is questionable whether the recommendations of the court-ap-
pointed Committee of Experts would even fall within the appropriate limits of the court's
remedial authority in light of the Supreme Court's recent decisions, which establish that a
district court should not exercise its equitable powers except to remedy a constitutional
violation. See Pitts, 503 U.S. at 489. The Committee's Report "called for an effort to pro-
duce more integration of an educationally beneficial sort and for an expansion of the
successful reforms to other Consent Decree schools where there had been few gains for
minority students." San Francisco NAACP, 1993 W.L. 299365, at *1.
132 See San Francisco NAACP, 1993 W.L. 299365, at *1. I assume that if the Committee
had found the SFUSD to be violating the terms of the Consent Decree, the district court
would have mentioned it in its summary of the Committee's findings.
133 See supra notes 96-100, 120-24 and accompanying text.
134 See supra text accompanying note 98.
135 In 1994, the SFUSD managed to lower the minimum score for Chinese American
students from 66 to its current level of 62 by emphasizing language skills in both the verbal
and math portions of the entrance test. See Siskind, supra note 15, at A13.
136 See Spangler, 427 U.S. at 436.
'37 See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (as-
serting that measures assuring a specific percentage of members of particular racial/ethnic
groups are "facially invalid"); Spangler, 427 U.S. at 436 (prohibiting a district court from
requiring the maintenance of a particular "racial mix");Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., 401 U.S. 1, 24 (1971) (prohibiting a district court from prescribing "any
particular degree of racial balance or mixing"). Full discussions of the Bakke and Swann




THE EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE
The Ho plaintiffs claim that Paragraph 13 of the 1983 Consent
Decree violates their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protec-
tion by singling them out on the basis of race and holding them to
standards higher than all other racial/ethnic groups. Paragraph 13
requires that every school in the district enroll students from at least
four racial/ethnic groups.1 38 In addition, no single ethnic/racial
group may comprise more than forty-five percent of the total student
enrollment at a regular school, or more than forty percent of the total
student enrollment at an alternative school.13 9 Lowell High is an aca-
demic alternative school, and thus must comply with Paragraph 13's
forty percent racial cap. At the same time, Lowell is the only school in
the district that employs a competitive admissions policy,14° admitting
students according to a sixty-nine point numerical index based on
grades and test scores.
Due to Paragraph 13's forty percent racial cap, Chinese Ameri-
cans, who comprise more than one-third of the district's total school-
aged population, 141 must outscore all other racial/ethnic groups, in-
cluding Whites, to gain admission to Lowell. For the 1994-95 school
year, minimum scores for admission to Lowell were sixty-two for Chi-
nese Americans, fifty-eight for Whites and other Asian Americans, and
fifty-three for Black and Latino Americans. 42 In the previous year,
the disparity of treatment amongst different racial/ethnic groups was
even greater. 43
There is no question that the plaintiffs' allegations of disparate
treatment are true. The forty percent racial caps clearly operate to
keep a significant number of otherwise qualified applicants out of
Lowell merely because they are Chinese.'4 Resolution of the Ho
claim thus centers on whether the SFUSD's racial cap system, which is
part of a larger desegregation scheme, violates the Fourteenth
138 San Francisco NAACP, 576 F. Supp. at 53.
189 See id.
140 Ho v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., No. C-94-2418 (N.D. Cal. motion to dismiss
denied, September 28, 1995), 2 n.2.
141 See Siskind, supra note 15, at A13 (noting that because of low dropout rates among
Chinese American students, more than a third of the SFUSD's seniors are of Chinese de-
scent, and, consequently, almost half of the regular and magnet high schools in the district
are "capped out" for Chinese American children).
142 See Wagner, sura note 13, at A2.
143 See Siskind, supra note 15, at A13 (Minimum scores for admission to Lowell in 1993
were 66 for Chinese Americans, 59 for Whites and other Asians, and 56 for Blacks and
Latinos.).
144 In the fall of 1995, 94 Chinese American students with scores equal to or surpassing
the cut-off point for Whites and other Asians were turned away from Lowell. See Woo,
supra note 2, at A6.
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Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. This Part begins by analyzing
the likely effect of the Supreme Court's recent desegregation cases on
the district court's analysis of the SFUSD's system of race conscious
student assignments. It then analyses the merits of Ho's equal protec-
tion challenge in light of the Court's current attitudes toward classifi-
cations based on race and racial quotas.
A. The Likely Impact of the New Desegregation Jurisprudence
on Race-Based Remedial Measures in Public Schools
Several commentators have suggested that in the school desegre-
gation area, the Supreme Court has traditionally imposed a lower
standard of scrutiny when reviewing race conscious remedies.145 The
Court's approval of a numerical race-balancing quota in Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education appears to support this propo-
sition.146 Indeed, in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,147 the
University had argued for the application of what it perceived to be
the less exacting standard of scrutiny for desegregation cases in de-
fending its sixteen-seat special admissions program. 48 But Justice
Powell, writing for a plurality of the Court, rejected this argument,
noting that " [e] ach [desegregation case] involved remedies for clearly
determined constitutional violations."'149 The recent desegregation
cases' 50 reemphasize Justice Powell's statement by focusing on the
causal connection between a specific constitutional violation and any
race-conscious remedy a district court orders to correct it.
The Court's recent desegregation cases are thus likely to have a
significant impact on the district court's consideration of the SFUSD's
race-based student assignment plan. Mere dissolution of the Consent
Decree would not automatically result in any change in the SFUSD's
policies for assigning students to its schools. Withdrawal of federal
supervision and return to local control would appear to leave school
authorities free to employ any student assignment plan of their choos-
ing, including maintenance of Paragraph 13. Indeed, one odd twist in
the Ho case is that the SFUSD and the NAACP, who were opposing
145 See, e.g., Selena Dong, Note, "Too Many Asians": The Challenge ofFightingDiscrimina-
tion Against Asian-Americans and Preserdng Affirmative Action, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1027, 1034-35
(1995) (noting that the Supreme Court has upheld racial quotas in the school desegrega-
tion area, while it has struck them down in employment and medical school admissions);
Natapoff, supra note 23, at 1085 (arguing that a white student's challenge to race-based
score differentials would be likely to fail in light of the Court's traditional deference to
federally supervised desegregation plans).
146 401 U.S. at 25. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
147 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
148 See id. at 300.
149 Id.
150 See discussion supra Part II.B.
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parties in the original desegregation case,' 15 are joined as co-defend-
ants in the current litigation. In most of the Supreme Court's dissolu-
tion cases, the school authorities themselves sought release from court
supervision.' 5 2 The fact that the San Francisco school authorities are
defendants in the Ho suit suggests that they wish to maintain Para-
graph 13's racial cap system for assigning students.
The real significance of Spangler, Dowell, Pitts, and other recent
cases may thus lie in their revelation that the Supreme Court does not
charge school authorities with an "affirmative duty" to maintain inte-
grated schools.' 53 If local school authorities have once implemented
a desegregation plan and complied with it for a reasonable period of
time, their continuing duty is merely to-refrain from engaging in in-
tentionally discriminatory activities that violate the Constitution. 5
4
This strongly suggests that a school district, once released from a de-
segregation decree, may classify students on the basis of race only if it
satisfies the same standard of strict scrutiny that the Supreme Court
currently requires for "all racial classifications, whether imposed by a
federal, state, or local actor."' 55
B. "Benign" Uses of Race: The Affirmative Action Cases
In Korematsu v. United States,'56 the Supreme Court declared that
all official distinctions based on race are "immediately suspect" and
"subject... to the most rigid scrutiny."1 57 Despite these strong words,
the Court has not been entirely consistent in its treatment of race-
based distinctions, but has sometimes acknowledged "that in order to
remedy the effects of prior discrimination, it may be necessary to take
race into account."5t Moreover, as Professor Laurence Tribe has
noted, the Court has at times "accepted the proposition that affirma-
'51 See San Francisco NAACP v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 576 F. Supp. 34 (N.D.
Cal. 1983).
152 The exact status of the Chinese American plaintiffs in Ho is not clear. On the one
hand, the court may consider them parties to the original suit, because the NAACP sued
the SFUSD on behalf of all minority school-children eligible to attend school in the dis-
trict. See id. at 36. Even if the Ho plaintiffs are not considered to be parties, standing
should not present an obstacle to their attack on the Consent Decree in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Martin v. Wdks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989), in which the Court held
that individuals who were not parties to an original proceeding giving rise to a consent
decree cannot be precluded from attacking the judgment.
153 See, e.g., Spangler, 427 U.S. at 435-36 (holding that changes in demographics not
attributable to actions of school authorities, do not give rise to any new duty to
desegregate).
154 This conclusion follows from the Court's repeated declarations that the scope of a
school board's constitutional duty is determined by the proven existence of a constitu-
tional violation. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490-91 (1992).
155 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2100-01 (1995).
156 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
157 Id. at 216.
158 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 (1986).
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five attention to race... may sometimes be expressed quantitatively
through the use of numerical goals and set-asides for racial
minorities."' 5 9
Advocates of affirmative action were thus initially unsure whether
the Court would apply a lower standard of scrutiny to racial prefer-
ence programs benefiting members of minority groups. However, be-
ginning with its decision in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke,160 the Court began to express intolerance for any distinctions
based on race and directed particular acrimony toward numerical
quotas or set-aside programs that benefitted members of minority
groups. Although the Bakke Court failed to produce a majority opin-
ion and thus failed to conclusively establish the proper standard of
review for "remedial race-based governmental action," 161 the Court,
relying heavily on Powell's plurality opinion, finally achieved a major-
ity and resolved the issue in City of Richmond v. fA. Croson Co.162 In
Croson, the Court held that courts reviewing racial classifications
should apply strict scrutiny,163 and that "the standard of review under
the Equal Protection Clause [was] not dependent on the race of those
burdened or benefitted by a particular classification."1 64 The Court
reaffirmed the Croson holding in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,165
in which it ruled that "all racial classifications, imposed by whatever
federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a re-
viewing court under strict scrutiny."'166 Under the strict scrutiny stan-
dard, "[race-based] classifications are constitutional only if they are
narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental
interests."167
1. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke
The Court first articulated its current standard of review for af-
firmative action programs in 1978 in Regents of the University of Calfor-
nia v. Bakke.168 Because the Bakke case raised issues very similar to
those raised in the Ho litigation, it provides an excellent analytical tool
159 LAiRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-22, at 1522 (2d ed. 1988)
(citing Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Assoc. v. E.E.O.C., 478 U.S. 421, 450 (1986)
(plurality opinion); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 484-89 (1980) (plurality opinion);
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 332 U.S. 193 (1979)).
160 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
161 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2109 (1995).
162 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (striking down a city ordinance requiring that 30% of all gov-
ernment construction contracts be awarded to minority-owned businesses).
163 See id. at 493.
164 Id. at 494.
165 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
166 Id. at 2113.
167 Id.
168 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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for assessing the merits of the Ho plaintiffs' equal protection claim.
The special admissions program at issue in the case was a voluntarily
adopted affirmative action program that reserved sixteen out of one
hundred seats in the entering class at the Medical School of the Uni-
versity of California at Davis for "disadvantaged or minority" appli-
cants. 169 Allan Bakke, a white male applicant rejected by the
admissions committee in two consecutive years, 170 brought suit against
the Medical School claiming that the "special admissions program op-
erated to exclude him from the school on the basis of his race, in
violation of his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment."'171
In ordering the University to admit Bakke to the Medical
School,172Justice Powell, writing for a plurality of the Court, held that
the special admissions program violated the Equal Protection Clause
by disregarding individual rights and distributing benefits and impos-
ing burdens according to race. 175 The plurality discussed at length
the unfeasibility and undesirability of developing a "principled basis
for deciding which groups would merit 'heightened judicial solici-
tude' and which would not,"174 and concluded that "[i] t [was] far too
late to argue that the guarantee of equal protection to all persons per-
mits the recognition of special wards entitled to a degree of protec-
tion greater than that accorded others."'175
The Bakke plurality thus rejected the idea that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause allowed "preferential treatment and corresponding judi-
cial tolerance"' 76 for racial classifications benefiting members of
traditionally disadvantaged minority groups. Emphasizing that the
Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection was an individual
right, the plurality noted that "[t]he guarantee of equal protection
cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and some-
thing else when applied to a person of another color."
177
Moreover, in rejecting the University's contention "that discrimi-
nation against members of the white 'majority' [could not] be suspect
if its purpose [could] be characterized as 'benign',"178 Justice Powell
asserted that "[t]he concepts of 'majority' and 'minority' necessarily
reflect temporary arrangements," 179 and that such a "two-class theory"
169 Id. at 272.
170 See id. at 276.
171 Id. at 277-78.
172 See id. at 320.
173 See id.
174 Id. at 296.
175 Id. at 295.
176 1& at 295-96.
177 Id. at 289-90.
178 Id. at 294.
179 Id. at 295.
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would require a "kind of variable sociological and political analysis...
[outside] the judicial competence."180 The United States, asserted
Justice Powell, was a "Nation of minorities."' 8
2. Racial Quotas
More particularly, the Bakke plurality voiced vehement disap-
proval of the University's use of a numerical quota to ensure diversity
in the medical school's entering class. Indeed, Justice Powell opened
his constitutional analysis of the set-aside program with the following
caveat:
If petitioner's purpose is to assure within its student body some
specified percentage of a particular group merely because of its race
or ethnic origin, such a preferential purpose must be rejected not as
insubstantial but as facially invalid. Preferring members of any one
group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimina-
tion for its own sake. This the Constitution forbids.' 8 2
Justice Powell's distress over the sixteen-seat set-aside program
was based on the fact that it effectively denied white students equal
opportunity to compete for all one hundred seats in the Medical
School's entering class merely because of their racial or ethnic back-
ground.'8 3 Although the Bakke Court agreed that the University had a
compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body,'8 4 it con-
demned the University's use of race as the sole criterion for adjudging
diversity.'85 The "two-track program" adopted by the University
would, taken to its worst logical extreme, lead "to the illogical end of
insulating each category of applicants with certain desired qualifica-
tions from competition with all other applicants"-an end which Pow-
ell characterized as "inconceivable.' u86
Bakke was neither the first nor the last case in which the Court
articulated its distaste for explicit racial quotas.' 8 7 Even in the field of
school desegregation, where the Court had not categorically prohib-
ited the use of racial quotas, the Court has never endorsed them as a
desirable or lasting remedy. In Swanr, s88 for example, the desegrega-
180 Id. at 297.
181 Id. at 292 (citation omitted).
182 Id. at 307.
183 See id. at 305.
184 See id. at 311-12.
185 See id. at 315.
186 Id.
187 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2102 (1995) (requir-
ing strict scrutiny of a federal statute establishing a 5% set-aside program for awarding
construction contracts to "socially and economically disadvantaged individuals"); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 469 (1989) (striking down Richmond's 30%
minority set-aside plan for awarding city construction contracts).
188 402 U.S. 1, 1 (1971).
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tion plan at issue imposed a 71%-29% racial balance quota on individ-
ual schools.'8 9 Although the Court ultimately approved the provision
as "within the equitable remedial discretion of the District Court,"' 90
the unanimous opinion placed special emphasis on the fact that "the
use made of mathematical ratios was no more than a starting point in
the process of shaping a remedy, rather than an inflexible require-
ment."' 91 Moreover, the Court explicitly noted in dicta that if the de-
segregation decree "require[d] . . . any particular degree of racial
balance or mixing, that approach would be disapproved and we would
be obliged to reverse.'
u92
3. Diversity
Although the Bakke plurality condemned the Davis Medical
School's explicit racial quota program, it nevertheless left room for
the continued operation of affirmative action programs. In holding
that "the attainment of a diverse student body" was "clearly... a con-
stitutionally permissible goal,"' 93 and that race and ethnicity could "be
deemed a 'plus' in a particular applicant's file"' 94 as long as the admis-
sion policy "[did] not insulate the individual from comparison with all
other candidates for the available seats,"' 95 the Court clearly permit-
ted the University to continue to consider race in making its admis-
sions decisions.
C. Analysis of the Ho Equal Protection Claim
In light of the Court's current attitude toward desegregation de-
crees and the racial quota systems, the Ho plaintiffs should have no
difficulty prevailing on their Fourteenth Amendment claim.196 The
factual underpinnings of their equal protection challenge are essen-
tially identical to and probably stronger than Allan Bakke's claim: Due
to the SFUSD's court ordered student assignment plan, which fore-
closes them from competing for more than forty percent of the seats
in an entering class, they have been denied the benefit of participat-
ing in Lowell's enriched academic program-a benefit they indisputa-
bly would have enjoyed had they been born anything but Chinese.
197
189 See id. at 23. The 71%-29% ratio employed by the Charlotte-Mecklenberg school
system approximated the proportion of White to African American students within the
district. See id. at 6.
190 Id. at 25.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 24.
193 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12.
194 Id. at 317.
195 Id.
196 But see Dong, supra note 145, at 1030 (arguing that the racial cap system would
probably be upheld under the precedent of the public school desegregation cases).
197 See supra note 17.
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1. Paragraph 13 Operates as an Inflexible Racial Quota System
Davis Medical School's sixteen seat set-aside foreclosed white stu-
dents from competing for 16% of the available seats in each entering
class. Paragraph 13 of the Consent Decree forecloses students from
competing for 60% of the available seats in Lowell's entering class.
Paragraph 13 differs from the Davis Medical School's special admis-
sions program,198 however, in that it subjects members of all racial/
ethnic groups to the same 40% limit. Thus, in theory, the racial caps
do not necessarily impose any greater burden on Chinese Americans
than on other groups of students. In practice, however, the racial
caps operate as precisely the sort of quota system that the Supreme
Court has repeatedly condemned.199
First, by requiring schools in the SFUSD to enroll students from
at least four ethnic/racial groups and then limiting the maximum rep-
resentation by any single group to 40% of the total student body,200
Paragraph 13 attempts to ensure a "particular degree of racial balance
or mixing" within each school.20 1 The Court specifically stated that it
would disapprove and reverse such an approach to integration in
Swann.202 In addition, in Bakke, the Court labeled measures seeking
"to assure within [a] student body some specified percentage of a par-
ticular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin.., as facially
invalid" under the Fourteenth Amendment.203
Second, Paragraph 13's racial diversity requirements insulate
members of each racial/ethnic group from competition with mem-
bers of other groups solely because of their race. Each member of a
specified racial/ethnic group competes only against other members
of the same group for admission to Lowell. This insulating effect ex-
plains why Chinese Americans must score higher than all other
groups to gain admission to Lowell. Chinese American students out-
number all other groups of students within the SFUSD. To maintain
the 40% racial cap requirements of Paragraph 13, school authorities
must turn away a large number of Chinese American students with
scores equal to or surpassing the minimum admission scores for mem-
bers of other groups. Paragraph 13 thus presents an example of the
very sort of "multi track program" which "insulat[es] each category of
applicants with certain desired qualifications from competition with
all other applicants" which Justice Powell characterized as "inconceiv-
198 See supra Part UI.B.1 & 2.
199 See supra Part Ill.B.2.
200 See San Francisco NAACP v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 576 F. Supp. 34, 53
(N.D. Cal. 1983).
201 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 24 (1971).
202 See id.
203 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307.
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able" in Bakke.204 It fails to treat students as individuals, and forecloses
many Chinese Americans "from all consideration... simply because
[they are] not the right color or ha[ve] the wrong surname. 20 5
2. Paragraph 13 Does Not Further the Compelling Interest of
Attaining "Genuine Diversity'S06
The Bakke Court held that "the attainment of a diverse student
body" was "clearly . . . a constitutionally permissible goal. ' 20 7 How-
ever, Bakke indicated that the Court would not view a plan which used
race or ethnicity as its sole defining criterion as a constitutionally per-
missible means of achieving diversity.20 Indeed, the Bakke Court as-
serted that a diversity plan that "focused solely on ethnic diversity,
would hinder rather than further attainment of genuine diversity."209
Like the unconstitutional Davis plan, the SFUSD's student assignment
plan focuses exclusively on racial or ethnic background to achieve a
desirable level of "diversity" in its schools.210 Paragraph 13 does not
require, and Lowell does not consider, any factor other than race in
making its admissions decisions. Thus, the SFUSD's plan fails to sat-
isfy the Court's definition of "the diversity that furthers a compelling
state interest,"21' which must "encompass[ ] a far broader array of
qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but
a single though important element."212
3. Paragraph 13 Is Not a Remedial Measure
The Court requires that classifications based on race be "strictly
reserved for remedial settings." 213 As previously mentioned, Para-
graph 13's racial caps function as affirmative action for Whites by
holding Chinese Americans to a higher standard than Whites. In the
1993 school year, for example, Lowell admitted only thirty-five per-
cent of all Chinese American applicants, but admitted sixty-five per-
cent of all White applicants, "even though half of the whites accepted
scored lower than all of the Chinese American students accepted."214
204 Id. at 315.
205 Id. at 318.
206 Id. at 315.
207 Id. at 311-12.
208 See id. at 315.
209 Id.
210 San Francisco NAACP v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 576 F. Supp. 34, 53 (N.D.
Cal. 1983).
211 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315.
212 Id.
213 City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
214 LoraJo Foo & Laura Ho, The Lowell Case: Don't Litigate; Cooperate, S.F. EXAMINER,
July 5, 1995, at A13.
206 [Vol. 82:182
NOTE-SAFETY IN NUMBERS?
Indeed, White Americans enjoyed the highest acceptance rate, and
Chinese Americans the lowest, of all ethnic/racial groups. 215
Even assuming that Bakke, Croson, and Adarand stand for the prop-
osition that Whites are now just another minority group in a Nation of
minorities, the SFUSD would nevertheless have to undertake the ludi-
crous task of attempting to present legitimate evidence of "specific
instances of discrimination" against Whites in order to justify its use of
racial quotas that burden Chinese Americans. 216 AsJustice O'Connor
noted in Croson, "[b] ecause racial characteristics so seldom provide a
relevant basis for disparate treatment... it is especially important that
the reasons for any such classification be clearly identified and un-
questionably legitimate."
217
4. Paragraph 13 Is Not Narrowly Tailored
By operating as affirmative action for Whites, Paragraph 13 al-
most certainly fails to qualify as a remedial measure under the
Supreme Court's current strict scrutiny standard, and the Ho plaintiffs
may prevail on that ground alone. In addition, it is doubtful that a
court could consider Paragraph 13's racial cap system, which fore-
closes Chinese Americans from the opportunity to compete for sixty
percent of all available seats, to be "narrowly tailored" in light of
Croson.218 In Croson, the Court stated that a thirty percent minority
set-aside program for city construction contracts "[could] not be said
to be narrowly tailored to any goal, except perhaps outright racial bal-
ancing."219 As previously discussed, the Court considers racial balanc-
ing measures to be "facially invalid."220
D. Summary of Conclusions
The Ho plaintiffs will very likely prevail on their Fourteenth
Amendment challenge to Paragraph 13's racial cap system for as-
signing students to San Francisco schools. First, the racial caps oper-
ate as a rigid racial quota, denying Chinese American students
opportunities to participate or even compete for placement in Lowell
High School's enriched academic program solely because they are
215 See id.
216 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307.
217 Croson, 488 U.S. at 505 (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 533-35 (1980)).
To provide an example of an illegitimate reason, O'Connor pointed to Bakke explaining
that the University of California's "desire to have more black medical students or doctors
S.. was not merely insufficiently compelling tojustify a racial classification, it was 'discrimi-
nation for its own sake,' forbidden by the Constitution." Id. at 496 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S.
at 307).
218 Id. at 507.
219 Id.
220 See supra Part Ill.B.2.
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Chinese. Second, the Supreme Court has already held that a govern-
ment actor seeking to further its compelling interest in diversity can-
not define diversity according to race or ethnicity alone. Third,
Paragraph 13 functions as affirmative action for Whites, and the
SFUSD will almost certainly fail in any attempt to establish specific
instances of discrimination against Whites sufficient to justify burden-
ing Chinese Americans. Finally, a court is unlikely to find that a diver-
sity plan which precludes a group from competing for sixty percent of
the available seats in an entering class is sufficiently narrow to pass
strict scrutiny.
IV
COMING FULL CiRcr: REMEDY AS WOUND
Judge William Orrick, who presided over the original proceed-
ings that produced the 1983 Consent Decree, and before whom the
Ho case is pending, has "noted that the discrimination issues raised by
the Chinese-American parents are 'almost identical' to the discrimina-
tion allegations that led to the consent decree."'221 Indeed, the Ho
litigation reveals the complexities involved both in taking account of
and in failing to take account of race in a contemporary, multi-racial
society. The Ho plaintiffs are simply individuals seeking vindication of
their Fourteenth Amendment right to receive equal treatment to
White students in the SFUSD. Although the Ho plaintiffs contend that
"this case is not about affirmative action,"222 it is clear that by attack-
ing the terms of the Consent Decree, the Chinese American plaintiffs
threaten to foreclose Black and Hispanic students, who, like Whites,
benefit from the terms of the Consent Decree, from gaining opportu-
nities to participate in Lowell's enriched academic program.223
In light of the conflicting interests involved in the case, Judge
Orrick will face a formidable task in framing a satisfactory resolution
to the suit. Opponents of the Ho litigation fear that if Paragraph 13's
racial/ethnic classification scheme and diversity requirements are
abolished, "Chinese Americans [will] overwhelm [Lowell], thwarting
diversity goals and denying disadvantaged students with academic po-
tential the chance to benefit from Lowell. '224 Supporters of the suit
221 Dorgan, supra note 13, at FOL.
222 Venise Wagner, Court Challenge Advances on S.F School Racial Caps: Federally-ordered
District Admission Policy Under Attack, S.F. ExAmrNER, Sept. 29, 1995, at A6.
223 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
224 Woo, supra note 2, at A6.
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complain that "[r]ace has taken priority over merit,"225 and that
"[u]lItimately, discrimination impacts individuals, not groups."226
In addition, the Ho litigation has sparked unrest not only among
different minority groups, but also within the Chinese-American com-
munity itself.2 2 7 Older Chinese American civil rights leaders oppose
"breaking ranks with the NAACP."228 For example, Henry Der, execu-
tive director of Chinese for Affirmative Action, asserts that "the legal
challenge imperils a greater good."229 In his view, "[t]here is no evi-
dence that Chinese American students are being harmed by race-
based admissions."230 Der argues that Paragraph 13, which separately
classifies Chinese, Koreans, Japanese, and Filipinos, actually allows for
a "combined total [of Asian Americans that] often surpasses the 40
percent cap."'231 Younger Chinese-American activists, on the other
hand, refuse to endorse "an alliance that foster[s] such clear cut dis-
crimination." 23 2 They argue that "kids are not fungible members of
racial groups, whose goals and dreams can be met vicariously by the
admission of a suitable number of other kids of the same race."233
The underlying facts of Ho thus provide a useful starting point for
discussing the larger conflict between proponents of affirmative ac-
tion programs who argue that race-based classifications are necessary
to enhance representation by minority groups, and opponents of af-
firmative action, who argue that race is irrelevant 234 and that the Four-
teenth Amendment's guarantee "cannot mean one thing when
applied to one individual and something else when applied to a per-
son of another color."235
225 Wade Lambert, Chinese-American Students Sue to Kill Affirmative-Action Plan, WALL ST.
J., July 25, 1995, at B16.
226 Lawrence J. Siskind, Rule of Law: San Francisco's Separate and Unequal Public Schools,
WALL ST. J., July 13, 1994, at A15.
227 See id.
228 Id.
229 Woo, supra note 2, at A6.
230 Wagner, supra note 222, at A2.
231 Id. Indeed, Der notes that "[a] lot of high schools in San Francisco are 70 percent
Asian." Id. See also Elaine Woo, Elite High School Has to Make Entry Tougher for Asian Teens,
HOUSTON CHRON.,July 16, 1995, at 34 (Asian Americans collectively comprise over 69% of
Lowell's current student body.).
232 Siskind, supra note 226, at A15.
233 Id.
234 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2112 (1995) (assert-
ing that race-based classifications have been long recognized as "irrelevant" in most cir-
cumstances and "therefore prohibited") (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S.
81, 100 (1943)); City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989) (arguing
that consideration of "such irrelevant factors as a human being's race" preclude the
achievement of a color-blind society) (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S.
267, 320 (1986) (Stevens,J., dissenting)).
235 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289-90. Justice O'Connor subsequently quoted this exact lan-
guage in her plurality opinion in Croson. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 494.
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A. The Basic Contradiction: Defining Equality
1. Color-blindness as a Societal Goal or Ideal: The Group Rights
Approach
The concept of color-blindness originated injustice Harlan's dis-
sent in the 1896 case of Plessy v. Ferguson, in which he observed that
"[o]ur Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates
classes among citizens." 23 6 Harlan argued that the "real meaning" of
segregation was "that colored citizens are so inferior and degraded
that they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by white
citizens. '23 7 In 1954, the Brown Court adopted Justice Harlan's view of
segregation, unanimously holding that "[s] eparate education facilities
are inherently unequal, '238 and embarking on a proactive effort to
desegregate the nation's public schools. 239
In 1978, fourJustices voted to extend the Brown Court's recogni-
tion that equal treatment does not always produce equality in the con-
text of affirmative action.240 In their joint opinion in the Bakke case,
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun asserted that
"claims that law must be 'colorblind' or that the datum of race is no
longer relevant to public policy must be seen as aspiration rather than
as description of reality."241 They warned that color-blindness should
not "become myopia which masks the reality that many 'created
equal' have been treated within our lifetimes as inferior both by the
law and by their fellow citizens."242
In a separate opinion, Justice Marshall, expressing bitterness at
the Court's failure to uphold the Davis Medical School's special ad-
missions program, wrote:
If we are ever to become a fully integrated society, one in which the
color of a person's skin will not determine the opportunities avail-
able to him or her, we must be willing to take steps to open those
doors. I do not believe that anyone can truly look into America's
past and still find that a remedy for the effects of that past is
impermissible. 243
Similarly, Justice Blackmun noted that "[i]n order to get beyond ra-
cism, we must first take account of race .... And in order to treat
236 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
237 Id. at 560.
238 Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
239 For a more detailed discussion of the school desegregation cases, see supra Part
IIA
240 Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun all voted to uphold the Davis
program in its entirety. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 326.
241 Id. at 327.
242 Id.
243 Id. at 401-02.
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some persons equally, we must treat them differently."244 In Black-
mun's view, failure to take account of race would allow the "Equal
Protection Clause [to] perpetuate racial supremacy."
24
Significantly, an approach to equal protection which embraces
affirmative action is not necessarily inconsistent with a color-blind
ideal. However, such an approach, which some commentators have
termed the "group rights" approach,246 assumes that the achievement
of the ideal cannot occur absent a preliminary leveling of the playing
field between Whites and members of minority groups.2 47 Preferen-
tial treatment of members of minority groups thus functions as a nec-
essary prerequisite to achieving that desired end.
2. Color-blindness as a Current Standard
Beginning with Bakke, however, a majority of the Court has
treated color-blindness not as a goal, but as a constitutionally man-
dated standard, uniformly applicable to all racial classifications, re-
gardless of who reaps the benefits or bears the burdens.2  In
adopting color-blindness as a current standard, the Supreme Court
has taken what is termed the "individual rights" approach to the Equal
Protection Clause.2 49 Unlike advocates of group rights, individual
rights theorists interpret Justice Harlan's statement in Pessy literally,
and espouse the view that "[r] ace is irrelevant, or should be."250 They
claim that programs which apply "corrective justice"25' result in an
"asymmetry among the wrongdoer, those who are compensated, and
those who pay the price of compensation." 252 They further argue that
"neither nonvictims should benefit, nor nonsinners pay," and reject
the notion that past and continuing discrimination against racial or
ethnic minorities legitimizes discrimination against and imposition of
244 Id. at 407.
245 Id.
246 See Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47 STAN. L. REv. 855,
859 (1995) (discussing the concept of group identity "as a sociological phenomenon");
Stephen Minnich, Comment, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena-A Strict Scrutiny of Af-
firmative Action, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 279, 299 (1995) (citing Charles Fried, Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Two Concepts of Equality, 104 HARv. L. REv. 107, 108-09 (1990)).
247 Minnich, supra note 246, at 299.
248 SeeAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2111-13 (1995) (requiring
strict scrutiny for all racial classifications).
249 Minnich, supra note 246, at 299.
250 Charles Lawrence III, Forward Ace, Multiculturalism, and the Jurisprudence of Transfor-
mation, 47 STAN. L. REv. 819, 823 (1995).
251 Professor Brest uses this term to describe the model of affirmative action that "alms
to make victims whole, to place them in the position they would have occupied absent the
injustice." Brest & Oshige, supra note 246, at 865.
252 Id. at 866.
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burdens on "innocent" Whites.2 53 Litigants such as Allan Bakke, J.A.
Croson, and Adarand Constructors have successfully prevailed on
such arguments before the Supreme Court.
Justice Powell articulated one version of an individual rights the-
ory in Bakke, by declaring that "[t] he guarantee of equal protection
cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and some-
thing else when applied to a person of another color."2 4 In Powell's
view, "[t]he concepts of 'majority' and 'minority' necessarily reflect
temporary arrangements and political judgments."255 Similarly, in
Croson, Justice O'Connor focused narrowly on the text of the Four-
teenth Amendment, which "provides that '[n] o State shall ... deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.',
256
Justice O'Connor asserted that unless strict scrutiny is uniformly ap-
plied to all race-based classifications, "race will always be relevant in
American life, and ... the 'ultimate goal' of 'eliminat[ing] entirely
from governmental decision making such irrelevant factors as a
human being's race' will never be achieved."257
In their most extreme form, as advocated by Justice Scalia, race-
based classifications are never a legitimate means of remedying past
discrimination.2 58 The more moderate approach asserts that race-
based classifications may still be upheld, but "only if they are narrowly
tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests."259
Not surprisingly, affirmative action programs fare very badly under
the color-blind standard. Indeed, in recent years, the Supreme Court
has struck down purportedly remedial race-based measures with in-
creasing regularity,260 leaving dissenting Justices and legal scholars to
question whether the Court's strict scrutiny of racial classifications is
"'strict' in theory and fatal in fact."261
255 Id. at 867 (quoting Kathleen Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative
Action Cases, 100 HARv. L. Ry. 79, 92 (1986)). Justice Powell echoed this sentiment in
noting the "inequity in forcing innocent persons... to bear the burdens of redressing
grievances not of their making." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298.
254 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289-90. Justice O'Connor quoted this exact language in striking
down affirmative action programs in two subsequent cases. SeeAdarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2108;
Croson, 488 U.S. at 494.
255 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 295.
256 Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
257 Id. at 495 (citation and footnote omitted).
258 See id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring).
259 Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113.
260 See, e.g., Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2097; Croson, 488 U.S. at 469.
261 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 362, 365 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-
Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protec-
tion, 86 1-A{v. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972)). SeeWygantv.Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 301-02
(1986) (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that a
race-based classification that "serves 'important governmental objectives' and is 'substan-
tially related to achievement of those objectives'" does not offend the Constitution).
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B. Chinese Americans as Angry White Males
Ironically, the Ho litigation aligns Chinese Americans not only
with individual rights theorists, but also with conservative politicians,
including House Speaker Newt Gingrich, who "carefully include[s]
Asian Americans in his attack against affirmative action."262 Ging-
rich's attack, which draws upon the image of Asian Americans as the
"model minority," posits that like Whites, Asian Americans are "'inno-
cent victims of... 'reverse discrimination'." 26 3
Relying on the same tactic, California Governor Pete Wilson has
referred to Asians in arguing that "'[iut is not just the 'angry white
males' who think the time has come for change. ' ' 26 Last year, Gover-
nor Wilson succeeded in "urg[ing] the University of California re-
gents to bar affirmative action in admissions and hiring,"265 and made
a California anti-affirmative action ballot initiative "a cornerstone of
his presidential bid."266 Although Wilson dropped out of the presi-
dential race, his anti-affirmative action initiative had, as of February
22, 1996, garnered the support of 1.1 million voters, "potentially more
than enough to qualify the measure for California's November
ballot"
267
C. Does Affirmative Action Really Hurt Asian Americans?
The Ho plaintiffs appear to embrace the premises underlying the
anti-affirmative action movement. Having pulled themselves up by
their bootstraps through hard work and dedication, they believe that
the only obstacle in their path to success-defined as a seat in the
entering class of Lowell High School-is a crummy old desegregation
decree fashioned in the age of dinosaurs when racial discrimination
was a problem. Their reaction is in many ways a natural one: "Abolish
the Consent Decree: then we will have access to what we have earned
and what we deserve."
The question that arises, however, is whether the Ho plaintiffs, by
arguing for unilateral dissolution of the Consent Decree and the insti-
tution of purely merit-based admissions to Lowell, are in reality seek-
262 Frank Wu, Neither Black nor White: Asian Americans and Affirmative Action, 15 B.C.
Tumn WoRLD L.J. 225, 225 (1995).
263 Id. at 226.
264 YumiWiWlson, Wilson Explains His Affirnative Action Plans, S.F. CHRON.,June 1, 1995,
at A1.
265 Lance Williams, Wson Eyes New Minority Program Cuts: Reported Proposal to Governor
Would Scrap U.C.'s Popular High School Recruitment Process, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 15, 1996, at
Al.
266 Sally Ann Stewart, Affirmative Action Faces Showdown: Ban on Programs Appears Headed
to California Ballot U.SA TODAY, Feb. 22, 1996, at 02A
267 Bid to Ban Affirmative Action Gains, SAN DIEGO UNIoN-TRIm., Feb. 22, 1996, at A3.
California voters approved Proposition 209 on November 5, 1996.
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ing a remedy that runs counter to their own interests.2 68 Although it
is clear that a system of strict meritocracy would enable more Chinese
Americans to attend Lowell, it is not at all clear that race-based reme-
dies have outlived their usefulness to Chinese Americans in contexts
beyond the classroom. As one Asian lawyer has remarked, "'[tlhese
students don't know. When they finish school they're going to hit a
wall.'"269
According to Professor Frank Wu, the apparent sensitivity of con-
servative politicians to the plight of Asian Americans is a disingenuous
political maneuver "manufactured for political gains,"270 which has
the effect of "pit[ting] Asian Americans against African Americans, as
if one group could succeed only by the failure of the other."27' Wu
argues that "[t]he real risk to Asian Americans is that they will be
squeezed out to provide proportionate representation to whites, not
due to the marginal impact of setting aside a few spaces for African
Americans. 272 Wu's larger point-that "the Asian-American experi-
ence should demonstrate the continuing importance of race and the
necessity of remedial programs based on race"27 3-merits further
exploration.
1. The Terms of the Myth
The model minority myth, which originated during Reconstruc-
tion,2 74 portrays Asian Americans as the Horatio Algers of minority
groups and seeks to "confirm[ ] the image of America as a 'melting
268 For a full discussion of the unique position of Asian Americans in the affirmative
action debate, see Wu, supra note 262.
269 John Schwartz, A 'Superminority' Tops Out, NEvswEEx, May 11, 1987, at 48, 48 (quot-
ing Boston attorney, Harry Yee).
270 Wu, supra note 262, at 227. Wu notes that "[t] he very fact that Asian Americans are
praised as a race belies the cause of color-blindness. The perception of even assimilated
Asian Americans as perpetual foreigners reveals how important race remains." Id. at 226.
271 Id. at 226. Wu further explains that "Asian Americans are encouraged to view Afri-
can Americans, and programs for them, as threats to their own upward mobility. African
Americans are led to see Asian Americans, many of whom are immigrants, as another
group that has usurped what was meant for them." Id.
Wu's observation that "[t]he real risk to Asian Americans is that they will be squeezed
out to provide proportionate representation to whites" gains support from the facts of Ho.
Id. However, a genuine conflict of interest does exist among members of various racial/
ethnic groups who seek admission to Lowell. At present, Lowell employs three different
merit-based admissions standards. The highest standard applies to Chinese Americans; the
intermediate standard applies to Whites and other Asians; and the lowest standard applies
to Blacks and Latinos. The obvious result of dissolution of the Consent Decree's racial
caps would be that Chinese Americans will displace some Whites and other Asians, who, in
turn, will displace Blacks and Latinos. As a consequence, representation by Chinese Amer-
ican, White, and other Asian students will rise, while representation by Blacks and Latinos
will fall.
272 Id. at 226.
273 Id. at 225.
274 See id. at 228-29.
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pot'."2 75 Hardworking, uncomplaining, law-abiding, family-oriented,
and successful, Asian Americans "are perceived to be relatively im-
mune from the economic social problems that beset other minority
groups, such as poverty, racial discrimination, high unemployment,
high crime rates, or unstable families."276 In contrast to African
Americans, who "never even made it into the pot,"2 77 "Asian Ameri-
cans are college whiz kids and champion entrepreneurs, winning the
annual Westinghouse Science Talent Search and selling cheap and
fresh fruits and vegetables in New York City."278 Indeed, as Professor
Wu aptly concludes, through the model minority myth, "an entire ra-
cial group can be rendered the equivalent of a single successful white
man."279
2. The Glass Ceiling
Although it is indisputable that Asian Americans are over-
represented at elite schools, numerous studies demonstrate that suc-
cess in education may not ultimately translate into success in the
workplace for members of the model minority.280 First, beyond the
educational arena, "merit" is no longer assessed according to easily
reducible factors such as grades or scores on standardized tests. As
Professor Wu observes, model minority images have a "reversible na-
ture ... which permits ostensibly 'positive' characteristics to be turned
into 'negative' attributes":28'
To be intelligent is to lack personality. To be hard-working is to be
unfairly competitive. To be family-oriented is to be clannish, "too
ethnic," and unwilling to assimilate. To be law-abiding is to be rig-
idly rule-bound, tied to traditions in the homeland, unappreciative
of democracy and free expression.
2 8 2
Thus the same qualities which are used to compare Asian Americans
to other minority groups, in order to denigrate the latter, take on a
different character when Asian Americans compete against Whites in
275 WLIAM P. O'HARE & JunY C. FELT, POPULATION REFERENCE BuREAU, INC., ASIAN
AMERICANS: AMERICA'S FASTEST GROWING MINORITY GROUP 15 (1991).
276 Id. at 3; see Schwartz, supra note 269, at 48 ("Many of the Asians' problems actually
stem from their image as a 'superminority'."); UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CVmL RIGHTS,
SUCCESS OF ASIAN AMERmCANS: FAaT OR FICTION? 19 (1980) ("[T] he belief is widely held that
Asian Americans are a successful minority who no longer suffer from disadvantage. This
belief, however, is not supported by the facts.").
277 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 401 (opinion of Marshall, J., dissenting).
278 Wu, supra note 262, at 238.
279 Id.
280 The statistical evidence revealing continuing workplace discrimination against
Asian Americans is discussed infra at notes 286-90 and accompanying text.
281 Wu, supra note 262, at 229.
282 Id. at 241; see also Schwartz, supra note 269, at 48 (noting that "a reputation for
quiet achievement can be interpreted as passivity").
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the marketplace. According to a recent report of the United States
Commission on Civil Rights,28 3 "even third- or fourth- generation
Asian Americans find their employment prospects diminished be-
cause employers have stereotypical views of Asians."28 4 Promotion de-
cisions, for example, which are highly subjective, leave Asian
Americans "vulnerable to managers who subscribe to stereotypical
views of Asian Americans as not having the qualities that make a good
manager."285
In addition, statistical evidence supports the proposition that
Asian Americans continue to suffer from discrimination. For exam-
ple, in 1990, forty percent of Asian Americans over the age of twenty-
five had completed at least four years of college, as compared to
twenty-three percent for non-Hispanic White Americans. 286 Neverthe-
less, a study by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
found that "it [was] easier for persons in the majority population to
obtain employment in higher level jobs without a college degree than
it is for the Asian Americans. ''287 Similarly, Asian Americans enjoy a
significantly lower "economic return for each year of additional
schooling."2 88 Moreover, although Asian Americans are well repre-
sented in occupations termed "professional" by the Census Bureau,
they are underrepresented both at the highest levels of management,
and in the managerial occupations in general. 289 Indeed, a study of
the ratio of administrators to professionals in San Francisco revealed
that "whereas blacks and Hispanics had roughly the same representa-
tion among professionals as among administrators, and whites were
more heavily represented among administrators than among profes-
sionals," Asian Americans lagged far behind, comprising "28 percent
of the city's professionals, but only 11 percent of the city's
administrators."
2 90
283 UNITED STATES CVL RIGHTS COMM'N, CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES FACING ASIAN AMERICANS
IN THE 1990S 130 (1992).
284 Id. See UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CVIL RIGHTS, supra note 276, at 24 ("Despite the
problems Asian Americans encounter, the success stereotype appears to have led policy-
makers to ignore those truly in need.").
285 UNITED STATES CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, supra note 283, at 135.
286 O'Hare & Felt, supra note 275, at 8.
287 UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 276, at 9. The study also found
that Asian Americans earn far less than Whites with the same level of education. See id. at
14.
288 O'Hare & Felt, supra note 275, at 8. The study found that Asian Americans' salaries
increased $2300 for each additional year of school, while whites gained almost $3000.
289 UNITED STATES CVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, supra note 283, at 133.
290 Id. at 134 (citation omitted).
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D. Alternative Remedies: Narrowing the Attack
Given the plethora of evidence demonstrating continuing dis-
crimination against Asian Americans, and keeping in mind the tradi-
tional caveat that "easy cases make bad law," the Ho plaintiffs may
ultimately be shooting themselves in the collective foot by climbing
aboard the color-blind bandwagon a mere forty-two years after segre-
gated schools were first abolished in Brown v. Board of Education.2 91 if,
as supporters of the litigation claim, the Ho suit is "about the impor-
tance of protecting individual rights," and not "about getting a few
more Chinese kids into Lowell,"2 9 2 the Ho plaintiffs may be well-ad-
vised to think twice before aiding the cause of conservative politicians
by mounting a unilateral attack on race-based remedies to combat dis-
crimination. In the final analysis, such an attack will certainly harm
the interests of Blacks and Latinos,2 9 3 and may not serve even the
plaintiffs' own individual interests.
Significantly, since Bakke, the Supreme Court has not re-ad-
dressed the constitutional permissibility of affirmative considerations
of race in the context of educational admissions. Thus, Bakke's hold-
ing that race represents "a single though important element" of con-
stitutionally permissible diversity,2 94 ostensibly remains good law.
Nevertheless, the current Court's clear intolerance of considerations
of race for any purpose, renders questionable the wisdom of tempting
the Court to reconsider the issue at the behest of members of a minor-
ity group. For if even minorities suffer harm by the imposition of
race-based remedies, the Court may have few qualms about rendering
further use of racial classifications per se invalid.
The purpose of this discussion, however, is not to criticize Chi-
nese Americans for standing up for their rights. Indeed, Chinese
Americans should not suffer in silence while they are blatantly dis-
criminated against in favor of Whites. Moreover, allowing worse treat-
ment of a historically discriminated against minority group than of
Whites does not comport with any formulation of the color-blind
ideal. Nevertheless, the Ho plaintiffs should take care in framing their
291 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
292 Woo, supra note 2, at Al.
293 See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text. Simple math demonstrates that if
Lowell's admission policy had held Chinese Americans to the same standard as Whites and
other Asians, all ninety-four Chinese American students who met the cut-off point of fifty-
eight for Whites and Other Asians would have been admitted. In contrast, although this
estimate is partially speculative, Lowell's entering class of seven-hundred might have in-
cluded as few as two students of African or Latino descent. (700 x 4.4% = 80.8 (number of
African American students who enrolled at Lowell in 1995); 700 x 9.3% = 65.1 (number of
Latino American students who enrolled at Lowell in 1995); 30.8 + 65.1 = 95.6 (combined
total of African American and Latino American students); 95.6 - 94 (number of Chinese
Americans rejected with score of 58 or higher) = 1.6).
294 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315.
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attack on the Consent Decree in order to protect their own interests
without unnecessarily harming the conflicting interests of other mi-
nority groups such as Blacks and Latinos, whose representation at
Lowell would dwindle if not for the continued use of Paragraph 13's
diversity requirements and racial caps. Rather than arguing for com-
plete dissolution, or complete maintenance of the Consent Decree,
the most satisfactory resolution to the dispute may be one which in-
volves compromise by both the Chinese American plaintiffs and the
NAACP. Before discussing the possible parameters of a compromise
solution, however, it is important to note a few of the alternatives.
1. Abolishing Lowell's Competitive Admissions
Some educators within the San Francisco Unified School District
"resent the siphoning of high-achieving students to Lowell."295 Such
critics charge that schools like Lowell are "elitist" and argue that "any
competitive enrollment is unfair and should be eliminated alto-
gether."2 96 Indeed, when Schools Superintendent Bill Rojas an-
nounced the opening of Thurgood Marshall High School "near the
homes of many black and Latino students who have never made it to
Lowell, in part because it is too far away," 297 he indicated that unlike
Lowell, Thurgood Marshall High would admit students by lottery.298
The underlying rationale for the lottery system is that strictly academic
criteria do not make sense in a multicultural society.29
9
Although random admissions would eliminate the problem of
disparate treatment of students of differing racial backgrounds, sup-
porters of competitive admissions worry that any policy other than
competitive admissions would signal the demise of Lowell's high aca-
demic standards.300 Some commentators thus suggest a variation on
the random admissions scheme. Henry Der,301 for example, proposes
"a lottery system that would set one standard for admission and then
admit students by certain racial backgrounds to get a mix."30 2 Assum-
ing that the standard would be set at a level that would ensure oppor-
tunities for participation by members of underrepresented groups
295 Tom Ross, Ending the Lowell "Brain Drain," S.F. ExAMrnER, Dec. 21, 1995, at A29.
296 Nanette Asimov & Tara Shioya, A Test for the Best Public Schools: They Go Beyond Race,
Grades in Quest for Quality, Equality, S.F. CHRON., June 21, 1995, at Al.
297 Id. at Al.
298 Id.
299 See id. at A6.
300 See id.
301 Der is the executive director of Chinese for Affirmative Action.
302 Jane M. Adams, Chinese Americans Can Sue Over S.F. School Admissions, SACRAMENTO
BEx, Sept. 29, 1995, at Al. See also Norman Matloff, Lowell High Plaintiffs Want it Both Ways,
S.F. CHRON., Dec. 8, 1994, at A29 (arguing that "[n]umerically defined merit should be
used... for only one reason, to weed'out students who would clearly be 'out of their
league' in courses of Lowell's level of rigor").
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such as Blacks and Latinos, this solution would both maintain aca-
demic standards and ensure diversity. On the other hand, it would
leave unaffected the primacy of racial classifications in student assign-
ments, and would not ensure that the most deserving students gained
admission.
2. Expanding Lowell's Admissions Criteria to Include Factors Beyond
Test Scores and Race
Lowell could also adopt an admissions policy akin to the
"Harvard College Admissions Program," discussed by justice Powell in
the Appendix to his Bakke opinion.30 3 A Harvard-type plan could in-
clude criteria "beyond grades and test scores," such as "Volunteer
work, interviews and creative skills."3 0 4 In addition, such a plan could
"giv[e] a boost to minorities who historically have had trouble getting
in" to Lowell.305 The obvious advantage of a Harvard-type plan is that
it would allow school authorities to take race into account without im-
posing rigid quotas or declaring any explicit policy of racial balancing
or mixing.
On the other hand, subjective criteria may not make sense in the
context of high school admissions. Thirteen year-old school children
may simply be too young to have had occasion and time to engage in
resum6-building activities, especially given that many of them proba-
bly do not come from socio-economically privileged backgrounds. In
addition, members of the Asian American community would almost
certainly oppose a subjective criteria admissions policy, because such
policies have resulted in discrimination against Asian Americans in
the past.3 0 6 As articulated by Henry Der, the fear of subjective criteria
plans is that they allow admissions committees to "'erect artificial bar-
riers, which on the surface appear to be neutral and color-blind, but
which in effect cause an adverse impact on otherwise highly qualified
and motivated Asian-American students.' 30 7
At the same time, subjective criteria plans exempt educational in-
stitutions from the scrutiny of and accountability to various constitu-
ent groups.303 In the 1980s, for example, the University of California
system was forced to confront charges of anti-Asian bias when Asian
American admissions rates began to lag behind those for Whites, de-
spite the increasing numbers of applications from Asian American stu-
303 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 321-24.
304 Asimov & Shioya, supra note 296, at A6.
305 Id.
306 The problem of discriminatory stereotyping of Asian Americans is discussed supra
Part IV.C.2.
307 Linda Matthews, When Being Best Isn't Good Enough, L-A. TIMES MAGAZINE, July 19,
1987, at 22, 26.
308 See id. at 25-26.
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dents.30 9 The change coincided with the University's decision to rely
more heavily on "supplemental criteria," which "work[ed] to the detri-
ment of Asian American applicants."31 0 Professor Wu explains the dis-
crimination against Asian Americans in terms of negative
stereotyping, which portrays Asians as "too interested in technical or
premedical majors, and individually... not well-rounded enough."3 11
Thus, if San Francisco school authorities were to adopt a subjective
criteria plan, they would need to ensure that the criteria they selected
would not have the effect of exacerbating invidious discrimination,
instead of alleviating it.
3. Creating More Schools Like Lowell
Another suggestion is that the San Francisco Unified School Dis-
trict should open more schools like Lowell. According to Professor
Henry Levin of Stanford University,31 2 much of the conflict between
different ethnic groups within the SFUSD stems from the fact that
there is "only a single high school in San Francisco [that] is viewed by
these groups as meeting the high academic standards that they
seek."31 3 Professor Levin argues that by opening "more 'Lowells' to
accommodate the demand," San Francisco could "revel in the fact
that so many families and students in San Francisco seek a strong aca-
demic experience. '3
14
Professor Levin clearly has a good point. The fact that so many
students in the district are clamoring for admission to Lowell is in-
deed something that the SFUSD should look upon with pride. Open-
ing more Lowells, or, for that matter, converting every school in the
district into a Lowell, is a possibility which the SFUSD should pursue
with vigor. A first-rate public school education should not be a scarce
commodity. Ambitious students need challenging school environ-
ments in which to learn and grow. The drawback to Professor Levin's
idea, however, is that it does not address the immediate problem fac-
ing Chinese Americans today. Thus, although educational reform
and improvement are ideas that the SFUSD should certainly keep in
mind as it plans for the future, a response to the current charges of
racial discrimination against Chinese Americans is needed now.
309 See id. at 26. Brown, Harvard, and Stanford Universities faced similar complaints.
See id. at 27.
310 Id. at 25.
311 Wu, supra note 262, at 268 (Wu asserts that this explanation "turned out to be
meritless.").
312 Opinion: Affirmative Action: A Question of Fairness at Lowelk The Public Responds, S.F.
CHRON., July 6, 1995, at A19.
313 Id. See also supra note 10 and accompanying text.
314 Opinion, supra note 312, at A19.
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4. A Compromise Plan
Recognizing the Ho plaintiffs' desire for a more immediate solu-
tion to the problems of racial discrimination in Lowell's admissions
policy, this Note advocates that Lowell adopt a policy that includes a
combination of merit-based and subjectively-measured criteria. In-
deed, as of the writing of this Note, San Francisco's school authorities,
working to resolve the Lowell controversy, developed such a hybrid
plan. On February 27, 1996, the San Francisco Unified School District
unanimously "revamped the admissions policy" at Lowell.3 15 Under
the new plan, which applies only to Lowell,3 16 and is effective immedi-
ately for the coming fall,317 Lowell will admit seventy to eighty percent
of its entering freshman class according to a single, merit-based stan-
dard set at sixty-three points out of sixty-nine. 18 Lowell will award the
remaining twenty to thirty percent of the seats according to a "value
added diversity" index,3 19 which gives special consideration to "socio-
economic status, difficulty of courses taken, extracurricular load, and
special challenges such as illness."3 20 In addition, the plan gives spe-
cial considerations to "Native Americans, Latinos and blacks, 'recog-
nizing the historical racial discrimination against these
communities'."321
Reactions to the new plan have thus far been mixed. The
NAACP, for example, "has given the new Lowell admissions policy its
stamp of approval."3 22 Roland Quan, spokesperson for the Ho plain-
tiffs, "called the new policy 'a move in the right direction'," but indi-
cated that the plaintiffs intend to proceed with the suit, which seeks
dissolution of the Consent Decree with regard to all schools in the
district.3 23 Anti-affirmative action advocate and University of Califor-
nia regent Ward Connerly, however, criticized the plan for "not
go[ing] far enough," arguing that it was morally unjustifiable to have
"low hurdles for some students and high hurdles for others."324




318 See id. at A16.
319 Id.
320 Id. The threshold score for students in the value-added diversity pool "could be as
low as 55 points, and possibly as low as 50 for some students." Id.
321 Id.
322 Venise Wagner, New Admissions Policy Approved for Lowell High: Changes Prompted by
Lawsuit Filed y Chinese Americans, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 28, 1996, at A3.
323 Nanette Asimov, Single Standard for Admissions at Lowell High: Exceptions for Income,
not Race, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 28, 1996, at Al.
324 Woo, supra note 315, at A16.
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E. Why the Ho Plaintiffs Should Embrace the New Plan
Given the probable impossibility of developing a solution to the
Lowell controversy that would completely satisfy all of San Francisco's
affected groups, the new compromise plan provides the best solution
to a difficult problem. First, it advances the cause of color-blindness
by holding all ethnic/racial groups to a single standard. Second, it
vindicates the right of Chinese American students to receive equal
treatment to Whites and other Asians. Third, it eliminates the possi-
bly constitutionally objectionable problems of discriminating against
Chinese Americans and providing affirmative action for Whites.
Fourth, it maintains sensitivity to the continuing need of Blacks and
Latinos for remedial measures to enhance their opportunities to at-
tend Lowell. Fifth, it gives affirmative consideration not only to race,
but to socio-economic status-a criterion that is race-neutral and may
benefit a broader sector of the city's disadvantaged but talented popu-
lation. Finally, it gives the Ho plaintiffs the opportunity to reconsider
their unilateral attack on race-based student assignments in San
Francisco.
CONCLUSION
This Note has analyzed and discussed the Fourteenth Amend-
ment equal protection challenge leveled by Chinese American stu-
dents against the terms of San Francisco's 1983 desegregation
Consent Decree in light of current Supreme Court jurisprudence re-
garding school desegregation and classifications based on race. The
Court's recent school desegregation cases focus heavily on withdrawal
of federal district court supervision and return to local control. The
cases also restrict district courts' remedial powers to instances of con-
tinuing constitutional violations by school authorities. These trends
support the Ho plaintiffs' claim for dissolution, which argues that San
Francisco has not operated segregated schools for at least ten years
and that the existing plan no longer fulfills its purpose of ensuring
fair and equal treatment of all of San Francisco's minority groups.
In the equal protection area, this Note has discussed the Court's
increasing intolerance for classifications based on race, regardless of
whether their purpose is to remedy the effects of historical discrimina-
tion against minority groups. All race-based classifications imposed by
government actors, both state and federal, are now reviewable under a
single standard of strict scrutiny. The Court's distaste for racial classi-
fications and refusal to permit them except for strictly remedial pur-
poses indicates that the Ho plaintiffs have a strong equal protection
claim. Paragraph 13 of the Consent Decree facially classifies students
according to race and imposes racial caps on members of each racial/
ethnic group. Moreover, it is undisputed that Paragraph 13 operates
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to exclude a disproportionate number of Chinese Americans from
gaining admission to Lowell, despite qualifications equal or superior
to those of other groups, simply because they are Chinese. Perhaps
even more significantly, this Note observes that the racial caps func-
tion as affirmative action for Whites, who will have difficulty establish-
ing the "specific instances" of "clearly identified and unquestionably
legitimate" discrimination required by the Supreme Court to justify
race-based preferences.
Nevertheless, despite the likely strength of the Ho plaintiffs' equal
protection claim, this Note argues that litigation is not the best means
of reaching a satisfactory solution to the Lowell controversy.
Although there is no way to predict how a court would answer the
question of the continuing validity of the Consent Decree's race-based
student assignment plan, exposing race-based remedial measures to
further curtailment or possible invalidation does not serve the inter-
ests of minority groups, including Chinese Americans, who continue
to face racial discrimination in many contexts. One way to protect the
continuing vitality of racial remedies is to refrain from raising them in
a judicial climate that is currently hostile to considerations of race,
and leans heavily towards a strictly color-blind standard.
In addition, an alternative solution is already available. School
officials within the San Francisco Unified School District unanimously
approved a new plan that alleviates racial discrimination against Chi-
nese Americans while simultaneously protecting the interests of Black
and Latino students. The new plan indicates the commitment of San
Francisco's school authorities to accommodating the conflicting inter-
ests of the differing racial/ethnic groups comprising the city's school
population. By developing the new plan, school authorities not only
responded sensitively and efficiently to the problems facing Chinese
American students, but they did so voluntarily-without prompting by
the district court.
Given the SFUSD's demonstrated willingness and ability to deal
fairly and sensitively with its various racial constituents, this Note advo-
cates that the Ho plaintiffs accept the compromise plan and refrain
from pursuing their broader attack on the Consent Decree and en-
dangering the continuing viability of affirmative considerations of
race within the SFUSD. The SFUSD's new plan for Lowell High
School represents a significant victory for Chinese Americans. The
newly created color-blind pool, through which Lowell will fill seventy
to eighty percent of its seats, will allow a larger number of Chinese
Americans to gain admission to Lowell. Moreover, under the new
plan, Chinese Americans will no longer be excluded from Lowell in
order to make room for Whites. Thus, rather than exacerbating racial
tensions and breaking ranks with other minority groups, the Ho plain-
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tiffs should accept the plan as a reasonable compromise that best
serves the collective interests of the larger community of which they
are a part.
Race-based remedial measures continue to serve a vital function
in a society that still has far to go before Chinese Americans, Black
Americans, White Americans, Latino Americans, Japanese Americans,
Hmong Americans, Korean Americans, and all other ethnic Ameri-
cans can simply say that they are Americans. Rather than pursuing
their litigation in a judicial climate that is currently hostile to the ac-
knowledgment of race-specific differences amongst the nation's citi-
zens, the Ho plaintiffs should embrace the spirit of cooperation,
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